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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case   
Robert Benjamin Brackett appeals from the district court’s order denying 
his motion for a new trial. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 In 2010, forty-six-year-old Brackett commenced a sexual relationship with 
sixteen-year-old N.B.  (#41578 R.1, pp.131-135; #41578 Trial Tr., p.222, L.20 – 
p.226, L.12.)  In January 2011, N.B. disclosed the relationship to authorities.  
(#41578 R., pp.131-135; #41578 Trial Tr., p.187, L.12 – p.191, L.13; p.319, L.13 
– p.320, L.13.)  After a subsequent investigation, Brackett was arrested on 
suspicion of sexual battery of a minor child.  (#41578 R., p.134; #41578 Trial Tr., 
p.774, Ls.1-11.)   
 Pursuant to a search warrant, officers recovered two cameras and an SD 
memory card from Brackett’s home.  (#41578 R., pp.135, 1020-1021; #41578 
Trial Tr., p.658, Ls.7-9; p.834, L.3 – p.835, L.10; p.846, L.3 – p.848, L.2; p.1021, 
L.2 – p.1023, L.18.)  Law enforcement officials recovered numerous sexually 
explicit photos of N.B. from the cameras and SD card.  (#41578 R., p.77; #41578 
Trial Tr., p.1275, L.12 – p.1276, L.6; p.1300, L.5 – p.1305, L.18, p.1309, L.16 – 
p.1334, L.7.)  A forensic report indicated that the photos were taken in the time-
frame of the reported sexual relationship between Brackett and N.B.  (See 
                                                 
1 Contemporaneous with this brief, the state filed a motion requesting that the 
Idaho Supreme Court take judicial notice of the clerk’s record and reporter’s 
transcripts associated with Brackett’s direct appeal, Docket No. 41578.  The 
district court referenced the underlying jury trial in its order denying Brackett’s 
motion for a new trial.  (R., pp.347-348.)   
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#41578 Trial Tr., p.2824, L.21 – p.2825, L.6.)  After a preliminary hearing, the 
court bound Brackett over on seven counts of sexual battery of a minor child 
sixteen or seventeen years of age, and eight counts of possession of sexually 
exploitative material.  (#41578 R., pp.163-165, 170-173, 175-190.) 
 Brackett’s first three appointed attorneys in the criminal proceeding 
withdrew from the case due to conflicts of interest.  See State v. Brackett, 
160 Idaho 619, 626, 377 P.3d 1082, 1089 (Ct. App. 2016).   Brackett’s fourth and 
fifth appointed attorneys withdrew as a result of Brackett’s uncooperative 
behavior.  See id.  
On March 5, 2012, the day of his scheduled jury trial, Brackett informed 
the district court that he had decided to represent himself.  (#41578 3/5/12 Tr., 
p.188, L.14 – p.229, L.24.)  The first jury trial ended in a mistrial after Brackett 
violated several pretrial orders during his opening statement.  (#41578 R., 
pp.1679-1680; #41578 10/29/12 Tr., p.24, L.6 – p.35, L.25.)  After a second trial, 
the jury found Brackett, who was still representing himself, guilty of eight counts 
of possession of sexually exploitative material and five counts of sexual battery of 
a minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age.  (#41578 R., pp.2645-2649.)  
The state had dismissed one of the sexual battery counts during the trial, and the 
jury could not reach a unanimous verdict on one of the other sexual battery 
counts.  (Id.; #41578 Trial Tr., p.698, L.18 – p.699, L.7.)   
The district court imposed a unified ten-year sentence with five years fixed 
on each count of possession of sexually exploitative material, and a unified 25-
year sentence with eight years fixed for each count of sexual battery of a minor 
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child sixteen or seventeen years of age.  (#41578 R., pp.2929-2936.)  The district 
court ordered all the sentences to run concurrently with each other, and with a 
sentence Brackett was serving in an unrelated case.  (#41578 R., p.2934.)  
Brackett raised seven issues on direct appeal, but the Idaho Court of Appeals 
affirmed the judgment of conviction.  Brackett, 160 Idaho at 624-635, 377 P.3d 
1082 at 1087-1098.  
 In January 2015, Brackett filed his first I.C. § 19-2406(7) motion for a new 
trial.  (R., pp.92-94.)  In the motion, Brackett alleged the discovery of new 
evidence regarding the authorities’ identification of him in the recovered 
photographs, and alleged previous false allegations of sexual misconduct made 
by N.B.  (Id.)  The district court, applying the Drapeau2 standard, denied the 
motion on the grounds that Brackett failed to show that the evidence was newly 
discovered, material, or would probably produce an acquittal.  (R., pp.95-99.)  
Brackett did not file a timely notice of appeal from the district court’s order.     
 In October 2015, Brackett filed his second I.C. § 19-2406(7) motion for a 
new trial.  (R., pp.108-112.)  The motion was accompanied by an affidavit of 
Timothy J. Miner.  (R., pp.111-112.)  In the affidavit, Miner alleged that he spoke 
with N.B. after the second jury trial.  (Id.)  According to the affidavit, N.B. told 
Miner that the prosecutor threatened to “put [N.B.] in prison for perjury and 
contempt of court” if she changed her anticipated testimony about Brackett’s 
conduct, and that N.B. should “just take the money for her and her family and 
walk away.”  (Id.)  Miner further alleged that N.B. informed him that she had 
                                                 
2 State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976).  
   4 
 
initially told authorities that “nothing happened” between her and Brackett, but 
she later changed her story so that she could “go about her day.”  (Id.)    
 The district court granted Brackett’s motion for appointment of counsel to 
represent him in the motion for a new trial.  (R., pp.117-118, 120-126.)  Appointed 
counsel filed an amended motion which included the Miner new evidence claim, 
as well as additional claims.  (R., pp.144-162.)  However, one week later, 
appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw from the case, citing a breakdown in 
the attorney-client relationship.  (R., pp.242-252.)  At a subsequent hearing, 
Brackett confirmed that he wished to represent himself.  (Tr.,3 p.3, Ls.13-16.)  
Brackett also informed the court that he wished to withdraw the amended motion 
for a new trial filed by appointed counsel.  (Tr., p.6, Ls.11-18.)  The district court 
granted appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw from the case and Brackett’s 
motion to withdraw the amended motion for a new trial that had been filed by 
appointed counsel.  (Tr., p.4, Ls.12-16; p.7, Ls.6-9.) 
 The district court then denied Brackett’s motion for a continuance and 
proceeded directly to argument on the merits of Brackett’s October 2015 pro se 
motion for a new trial.  (Tr., p.7, L.8 – p.47, L.5.)  At the conclusion of the hearing, 
the court denied the October 2015 motion.  (Tr., p.46, L.11 – p.48, L.3.)  In a 
subsequently-entered written denial order, the court concluded that the 
allegations in the Miner affidavit constituted inadmissible hearsay and could 
therefore not form the basis of a motion for a new trial.  (R., pp.343-350.)  In the 
                                                 
3 In its Respondent’s brief, with the respect to the transcripts that are a part of the 
appellate record in Docket No. 44143, the state only cites to the transcript of the 
April 1, 2016 hearing on Brackett’s second motion for a new trial.  Thus, that 
transcript is cited simply as “Tr.” 
   5 
 
alternative, the court concluded that Brackett failed to show that the evidence 
was material or would probably produce an acquittal considering the 
overwhelming evidence of Brackett’s guilt presented by the state at the trial.  (Id.)     
 Brackett timely appealed.  (R., pp.387-389.)  The district court granted 
Brackett’s motion for appointment of counsel to represent him on the appeal.  
See ICourt Portal, State v. Brackett, Twin Falls District Court Case No. CR-2011-
08021.  However, the Idaho Supreme Court later granted Brackett’s motion to 
represent himself.  (3/8/17 Order.)  Brackett proceeds pro se. 
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ISSUES 
 Brackett states the issues on appeal as:  
1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: In Violation of the 6th 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as well as [the] Idaho 
Constitution  
 
2. Continued Brady Violations: In Violation of the Protections of 
the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Idaho 
Constitution Due Process Clause 
 
3. Abuse of Court[’]s Discretion: In Violation of Equal 
Protection[s] Governed By The 14th Amendment Of The U.S. 
Constitution and Idaho Constitution Further Violating 
Defendant[’]s Due Process Rights 
 
4. Denial of Due Process: In Violation of the U.S. and Idaho 
Constitutions 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.2 (underlines in original).) 
 
 The state rephrases4 the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. Has Brackett failed to show that the district court erred by denying his 
second motion for a new trial?  
 
2. Has Brackett failed to show that the district court erred by failing to 
conduct a Faretta hearing before permitting him to represent himself at 
                                                 
4 The claims in Brackett’s Appellant’s brief are difficult to decipher.  The state has 
attempted to liberally construe these claims.  However, the state does not 
respond to various claims set forth in the brief involving ineffective assistance of 
counsel, Brady violations, and prosecutorial misconduct, on the grounds that 
these are not preserved, should have been raised on direct appeal or in a post-
conviction proceeding, were previously raised and are now barred by the doctrine 
of res judicata, or have no relevance to any challenges to the district court orders 
from which Brackett’s notice of appeal was actually timely.  The state further 
notes that, at the time of the filing of this brief, Brackett has a post-conviction 
petition pending in state court (see ICourt Portal, Brackett v. State, Twin Falls 
District Court Case No. CV-2017-00572), and that Brackett has filed at least one 
additional motion for a new trial since the clerk’s record was compiled in this case 
(see ICourt Portal, State v. Brackett, Twin Falls District Court Case No. CR-2011-
08021).  Some of the issues raised in Brackett’s Appellant’s brief may more 
appropriately be litigated in those proceedings. 
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the hearing on his motion for a new trial?  
 
3. Was Brackett’s pro se amended motion for a new trial moot when it was 
filed because the district court had already dismissed Brackett’s then-
pending motion for a new trial? 
 
4. Has Brackett failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his motion for a continuance after Brackett elected to represent 
himself at the second hearing on his second motion for a new trial? 
 
5. Did the district court lack jurisdiction to consider Brackett’s motion for the 
production of documents?  
 
6. Does this Court lack jurisdiction to consider Brackett’s challenges to the 
district court’s denial of his January 2015 motion for a new trial?  
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Brackett Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Denying His 
Second Motion For A New Trial 
 
A. Introduction 
Brackett contends that the district court erred by denying his second 
motion for a new trial.  (See generally Appellant’s brief.)  This contention fails 
because a review of the record reveals that Brackett’s motion was supported only 
by inadmissible hearsay.  Brackett has therefore failed to show that he has 
satisfied the applicable Drapeau standard or that the district court erred in 
applying that standard. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
Granting or denying a motion for a new trial is within the district court’s 
discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal unless that discretion is abused.  
State v. Jones, 127 Idaho 478, 481, 903 P.2d 67, 70 (1995); State v. Pugsley, 
119 Idaho 62, 63, 803 P.2d 563, 564 (Ct. App. 1991). 
 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion To Deny Brackett’s 
Motion For A New Trial 
 
A defendant may obtain a new trial “[w]hen new evidence is discovered 
material to the defendant, and which he could not with reasonable diligence have 
discovered and produced at the trial.”  I.C. § 19-2406(7).  In State v. Drapeau, 
97 Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976), the Idaho Supreme Court articulated the 
four-part test a defendant must satisfy in order to be entitled to a new trial based 
upon newly discovered evidence.  That test requires a defendant to show that the 
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evidence offered in support of his motion for a new trial: (1) is newly discovered 
and was unknown to the defendant at the time of trial; (2) is material, not merely 
cumulative or impeaching; (3) will probably produce an acquittal; and (4) failure 
to learn of the evidence was due to no lack of diligence on the part of the 
defendant.  Id. at 691, 551 P.2d at 978.  The burden to show that each of these 
criteria is satisfied rests with the movant.  State v. Dopp, 129 Idaho 597, 605, 
930 P.2d 1039 (Ct. App. 1996).   
In announcing this four-part test, the Court cited Professor Wright’s text on 
Federal Practice and Procedure and specifically noted his comment, “after a man 
has had his day in court, and has been fairly tried, there is a proper reluctance to 
give him a second trial.”  Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691, 551 P.2d at 978 (citation 
omitted). “Motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence are 
disfavored and should be granted with caution, reflecting the importance 
accorded to considerations of repose, regularity of decision making, and 
conservation of scarce judicial resources.”  State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 144, 
191 P.3d 217, 222 (2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (quoting 
State v. Hayes, 144 Idaho 574, 577, 165 P.3d 288, 291 (Ct. App. 2007)).  
In this case, in support of his second motion for a new trial, Brackett 
submitted a single affidavit.  (R., pp.111-112.)  The affidavit was compiled by 
Timothy J. Miner, who testified at the jury trial as a defense witness.  (Id.; #41578 
Trial Tr., p.2635, L.16 – p.2650, L.20.)  At the trial, Brackett attempted to elicit 
testimony from Miner that N.B. was a dishonest person and lied about her age.   
(#41578 Trial Tr., p.2649, L.24 – p.2650, L.20.)  However, the district court 
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sustained the state’s objection to this testimony.  (Id.) 
In the affidavit submitted in support of the motion for a new trial, Miner 
asserted that N.B told him that the prosecutor threatened to “put [N.B.] in prison 
for perjury and contempt of court” if she changed her testimony, and that N.B. 
should “just take the money for her and her family and walk away.”  (R., pp.111-
112.)  Miner further alleged that N.B. stated that she initially told authorities that 
“nothing happened” between her and Brackett, but she later changed her story 
so that she could “go about her day.”  (Id.)    
The district court applied the Drapeau test5 and properly denied Brackett’s 
motion.  (R., pp.343-350; Tr., p.46, L.11 – p.48, L.3.)  The court first concluded 
that the only evidence submitted by Brackett in support of the motion, the Miner 
affidavit, consisted of inadmissible hearsay and therefore could not form the 
exclusive basis of a motion for a new trial.  (R., pp.345-346.)  The court’s 
conclusion was correct. 
Hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
                                                 
5 The state notes that in State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380, 716 P.2d 1152 (1985), 
the Idaho Supreme Court held that “in appropriate circumstances, where a 
defendant submits an affidavit by a government witness in which the witness 
recants his testimony and specifies in what ways he dishonestly testified and in 
what ways he would, if given the opportunity to testify again, change that 
testimony and where a defendant makes a showing that such changed testimony 
may be material to a finding of his guilt or innocence, a new trial should be held.”  
Scroggins, 110 Idaho at 385, 716 P.2d at 1157; see also State v. Ellington, 
151 Idaho 53, 72-73, 253 P.3d 727, 746-747 (2011).  Though he does not 
specifically cite Scroggins in his Appellant’s brief, Brackett appears to assert that 
the district court erred in applying the Drapeau standard.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.7, 
13.)  However, Brackett did not submit any affidavits from any state witnesses 
recanting their own trial testimony.  Therefore, the Drapeau standard applied to 
Brackett’s second motion for a new trial. 
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matter asserted.”  I.R.E. 801(c). Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible.  
I.R.E. 802.  A district court conducting a Drapeau analysis may consider the 
admissibility of newly discovered evidence supporting a motion for a new trial in 
determining whether such evidence would probably produce an acquittal.  See 
State v. Palin, 106 Idaho 70, 77, 675 P.2d 49, 56 (Ct. App. 1983).    
The statements from the Miner affidavit attributed to N.B. and the 
prosecutor clearly constitute hearsay and hearsay-within-hearsay, respectively.  
Brackett offered the statements, as relayed by Miner, to prove the truth of the 
matters asserted – that the prosecutor threatened N.B., that N.B. was paid for 
her testimony, and that N.B. initially denied having a sexual relationship with 
Brackett.  On appeal, Brackett has not attempted to argue that any hearsay 
exception applies to these statements. Therefore, the statements were 
inadmissible and necessarily would not result in an acquittal.   
The district court also concluded that, even assuming the statements in 
the affidavit were admissible, Brackett still failed to satisfy the Drapeau test.  
Specifically, the court concluded: (1) Miner’s allegations would not probably 
produce an acquittal in light of the overwhelming evidence of Brackett’s guilt 
presented at trial; and (2) Miner’s allegations were, at best, merely impeaching 
and/or cumulative with testimony presented at the trial.  (R., pp.346-349.) 
As the district court concluded, the evidence against Brackett presented at 
trial was overwhelming.  Notably, the state’s case did not rely entirely on N.B.’s 
trial testimony.  N.B.’s testimony was substantially corroborated by photographs 
recovered from a camera and SD memory card found at Brackett’s residence, 
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and other evidence.  In support of its contention that the evidence of Brackett’s 
guilt was overwhelming, the state adopts its statement of facts from this brief, the 
prosecutor’s summary of the state’s evidence of Brackett’s guilt recited during her 
closing and rebuttal arguments at the conclusion of the second jury trial (#41578 
Trial Tr., p.2817, L.5 – p.2843, L.5; p.2899, L.10 – p.2910, L.22), and the district 
court’s summary of the state’s evidence in its order denying Brackett’s second 
motion for a new trial (R., pp.345-346).    
Additionally, as the district court concluded, Brackett failed to satisfy the 
second prong of the Drapeau test because the proposed evidence from the 
affidavit was merely impeaching, and not material.  
The Idaho Court of Appeals has described the difference between 
impeachment evidence and substantive evidence as follows: 
Unlike substantive evidence which is offered for the purpose 
of persuading the trier of fact as to the truth of a proposition on 
which the determination of the tribunal is to be asked, impeachment 
is that which is designed to discredit a witness, i.e. to reduce the 
effectiveness of his testimony by bringing forth the evidence which 
explains why the jury should not put faith in him or his testimony. 
 
State v. Marsh, 141 Idaho 862, 868-869, 119 P.3d 637, 643-644 (Ct. App. 2004).  
Evidence may be both substantive and impeaching.  Id. 
In this case, as the district court correctly concluded, the proffered 
statements of N.B. and the prosecutor constituted, at best, impeachment 
evidence.  The submission of the statements of both individuals, and any such 
theoretical use of these statements at a trial, would be designed to discredit 
N.B.’s testimony.  None of the statements would be offered “for the purpose of 
persuading the trier of fact as to the truth of a proposition” regarding whether or 
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not Brackett engaged in a sexual relationship with N.B. or possessed the 
sexually explicit photos of N.B.  Therefore, the district court properly concluded 
that Brackett failed to meet the second prong of the Drapeau test.  
Brackett submitted only inadmissible hearsay in support of his second 
motion for a new trial.  He therefore cannot show that the district court erred in 
denying this motion.  Further, even assuming that Miner’s affidavit contained 
admissible evidence, Brackett has still failed to demonstrate that the district court 
erred in concluding that he failed to satisfy the Drapeau test.  This court should 
therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Brackett’s second motion for a new 
trial. 
 
II. 
Brackett Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Declining To 
Conduct A Faretta Hearing Before Permitting Him To Represent Himself At The 
Hearing On His Second Motion For A New Trial 
 
A. Introduction 
Brackett contends that the district court erred by declining to conduct a 
Faretta hearing before permitting him to discharge counsel and represent  
himself at the hearing on his second motion for a new trial.  (Appellant’s brief, 
p.9.)  Brackett’s contention fails because a review of the record reveals that his 
decision to represent himself was voluntary.  
 
B. Standard Of Review 
The appellate court examines the “totality of the circumstances in 
determining the validity of a defendant’s waiver of counsel.”  State v. Anderson, 
144 Idaho 743, 746, 170 P.3d 886, 889 (2007). 
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C. Brackett’s Decision To Represent Himself At The Hearing On His Second 
Motion For A New Trial Was Voluntary 
 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to 
counsel during all “critical stages” of the adversarial proceedings against him.  
Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 562, 149 P.3d 833, 837 (2006) (citing United 
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967); State v. Ruth, 102 Idaho 638, 637 P.2d 
415 (1981)).  A motion for a new trial filed within the confines of a criminal case, 
before the judgment of conviction has become final, constitutes a critical stage of 
the proceedings to which the right to counsel attaches.  See McAfee v. Thaler, 
630 F.3d 383, 391 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Every federal circuit court to address the 
question of whether the post-trial, pre-appeal time period for making a motion for 
new trial is a critical stage has concluded that it is.” (citations omitted)).  
A criminal defendant also has a constitutional right of self-representation 
which derives from the Sixth Amendment.  Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 
818 (1975).  To validly waive the right to counsel the defendant must make a 
knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver.  State v. Dalrymple, 144 Idaho 628, 
633-634, 167 P.3d 765, 770-771 (2007) (citing State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 
64, 90 P.3d 278, 289 (2003)).  The State bears the burden to prove that the 
defendant voluntarily waived his Sixth Amendment rights.  Id.    
When determining whether a waiver of the right to counsel was valid, 
Idaho courts examine the totality of the circumstances.  Anderson, 144 Idaho at 
746, 170 P.3d at 889; see also Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 64, 90 P.3d at 289; State v. 
King, 131 Idaho 374, 376, 957 P.2d 352, 354 (Ct. App. 1998).  An Idaho appellate 
court’s determination of whether a waiver was valid is not limited to a review of 
   15 
 
the hearing at which the waiver was made: “[t]he particular moment of the waiver 
is not the only consideration; rather, the record as a whole is considered.”  
Anderson, 144 Idaho at 746-747, 170 P.3d at 889-890; see also Dalrymple, 
144 Idaho at 634, 167 P.3d at 771 (“While contemporaneous Faretta warnings 
are perhaps the most prudent means to ensure the defendant’s grasp of the 
disadvantages of self-representation, we look to the record as a whole to 
determine if [appellant] knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his 
constitutional right.” (citation omitted)).  
Therefore, there is no stand-alone right to a Faretta hearing.  Rather, the 
purpose of a Faretta hearing is to determine whether a defendant’s waiver of his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel was made knowingly and intelligently.  See 
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835-3086.  Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that Brackett 
had a constitutional right to counsel in the motion for a new trial proceeding, it is 
necessary only that the “record as a whole” show that Brackett knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily chose to waive this right, discharge his attorney, and 
proceed pro se. 
The record in this case shows that Brackett’s decision to represent himself 
at the hearing on the second motion for a new trial was voluntary.  First, it was 
Brackett who requested that counsel withdraw from the case.  (R., p.251; Tr., p.3, 
Ls.13-16.)  Further, Brackett is not unfamiliar with the concepts of appointed 
counsel and self-representation in criminal cases.  Prior to the district court’s 
November 2015 appointment of counsel in Brackett’s second motion for a new 
trial, and with the exceptions of his sentencing and direct appeal, Brackett had 
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represented himself in the underlying criminal case since he chose to terminate 
representation in March 2012.  (See R., pp.16-87.)  In this time, Brackett, in his 
pro se capacity, took part in two jury trials and filed numerous post-trial motions.  
(See id; see generally #41578 R.)       
In fact, before permitting Brackett to represent himself at the underlying 
jury trials, the district court engaged, on at least two separate occasions, in 
lengthy Faretta inquiries.  At these hearings, the district court informed Bracket 
that he would, in a pro se capacity, be bound by the relevant rules and 
procedures, that he might face difficulties investigating and researching his case 
as an incarcerated pro se inmate, that appointed counsel could assist him in all 
facets of the criminal proceeding, and that it is “almost always unwise to 
represent yourself in court.”  (#41578 2/27/12 Tr., p.109, L.2 – p.112, L.14; 
#41578 3/5/12 Tr., p.197, L.1 – p.229, L.8.)  At the conclusion of these inquiries, 
the district court found that Brackett voluntarily waived his right to counsel and 
that he did so with knowledge of the potential consequences of that decision.  
(#41578 3/5/12 Tr., p.227, L.3 – p.229, L.8.)  It is thus clear that Brackett was well 
aware of his right to counsel and the risks of self-representation when he elected 
to represent himself at the hearing on his second motion for a new trial. 
Brackett knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. He has 
therefore failed to demonstrate that the district court erred by declining to conduct 
a new Faretta inquiry at the hearing on his second motion for a new trial. 
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III. 
Brackett’s Pro Se Amended Motion For A New Trial Was Moot When It Was 
Filed Because The District Court Had Already Dismissed Brackett’s Then-
Pending Motion For A New Trial 
 
At the April 1, 2016 hearing on the motion for a new trial, after the district 
court granted both Brackett’s appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw from the 
case, and Brackett’s motion to withdraw the amended motion for a new trial filed 
by his appointed counsel, Brackett informed the court that he had recently mailed 
a separate, pro se amended motion for a new trial to the court.  (Tr., p.6, Ls.19-
23.)  However, at the time of the hearing, this pro se amended motion had not yet 
been filed with the district court.  (Tr., p.10, Ls.11-16.)  The district court informed 
Brackett that any subsequent motions for a new trial based upon the discovery of 
new evidence would be deemed untimely pursuant to I.C. § 19-2406(7) and 
I.C.R. 34, which requires such motions to be filed within two years of the final 
judgment.6  (Tr., p.6, L.25 – p.7, L.5; p.10, Ls.11-16.)  At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the district court orally denied Brackett’s second motion for a new trial.  
(Tr., p.47, L.13 – p.48, L.3.)  On April 4, 2016, the same day the district court 
entered its written denial order, Brackett’s pro se “amended” motion for a new 
                                                 
6 The district court was incorrect with respect to the theoretical timeliness of any 
subsequently-filed motions for a new trial.  Idaho Criminal Rule 34(b)(1) provides 
that motions for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence must be filed 
“within two years after a final judgment.”  For the purposes of this rule, a 
judgment becomes “final” not when the judgment of conviction is entered by the 
district court, but when the appeal or time for appeal has completed.  See State v. 
Parrott, 138 Idaho 40, 42, 57 P.3d 509, 511 (Ct. App. 2002).  The Remittitur in 
Brackett’s direct appeal was entered on August 5, 2016. (#41578 8/5/16 
Remittitur.)  Therefore, motions for a new trial grounded in the alleged discovery 
of new evidence would be timely pursuant to I.C.R. 34(b)(1) until August 5, 2018.  
The state submits that this incorrect statement of the district court, made during a 
hearing on Brackett’s separate, then-pending motion for a new trial, has no 
impact on the relevant issues in this appeal.   
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trial was filed with the district court.  (R., pp.266-275.)  It does not appear that the 
district court ruled on this “amended” motion for a new trial.    
While Brackett’s Appellant’s brief is somewhat unclear with respect to this 
issue, it appears that Brackett contends that the district court erred by failing to 
consider his April 4, 2016 “amended” motion for a new trial, and by informing him 
that any such motion would be untimely pursuant to I.C. § 19-2406(7) and I.C.R. 
34.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.11-12.)  Brackett has failed to demonstrate he is 
entitled to relief. 
First, Brackett’s April 4, 2016 “amended” motion for a new trial was moot 
upon its filing.  “An issue is moot if it presents no justiciable controversy and a 
judicial determination will have no practical effect upon the outcome.”  Smith v. 
Smith, 160 Idaho 778, 784, 379 P.3d 1048, 1054 (2016) (internal quotes and 
citation omitted).  “[T]his Court will not hear and resolve an issue that presents no 
justiciable controversy and a judicial determination will have no practical effect on 
the outcome.”  Mitchell v. State, 160 Idaho 81, 89, 369 P.3d 299, 307 (2016).  In 
this case, the district court denied the motion which Brackett was attempting to 
amend on April 1, 2016, at the conclusion of the hearing on the motion.  (Tr., 
p.47, L.13 – p.48, L.3.)  Therefore, Brackett’s subsequently-filed “amended” 
motion was of no legal effect.      
Additionally, even if Brackett’s amended motion for a new trial was not 
rendered moot upon its filing, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Brackett’s 
apparent contention that the district court erred because there is no adverse 
order from which Brackett may appeal.   
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The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that the following persons may appeal: 
“[a]ny party aggrieved by an appealable judgment, order or decree, as defined in 
these rules, of a district court ....”  I.A.R. 4.  An Idaho appellate court “does not 
review an alleged error on appeal unless the record discloses an adverse ruling 
forming the basis for the assignment of error.”  Ada County Highway Dist. v. Total 
Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 368-369, 179 P.3d 323, 331-332 
(2008) (citing De Los Santos v. J.R. Simplot Co., Inc., 126 Idaho 963, 969, 
895 P.2d 564, 570 (1995)).  Therefore, even though an issue was argued to the 
district court, there must be a ruling by the court to preserve the issue for appeal.  
In this case, the record does not contain an order denying Brackett’s pro se 
amended motion for a new trial.  Consequently, there is no adverse decision for 
this Court to review. 
Brackett’s pro se amended motion for a new trial was rendered moot when 
the district court denied his previously-filed motion for a new trial.  Even if the 
amended motion was not moot, there is no appealable order from which Brackett 
may appeal.  Brackett has therefore failed to demonstrate he is entitled to relief. 
 
IV. 
Brackett Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Denying His Motion For A Continuance After Brackett Elected To Represent 
Himself At The Hearing On His Second Motion For A New Trial 
 
A. Introduction 
Brackett contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying 
his motion for a continuance after he elected to represent himself during the 
hearing on his second motion for a new trial.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-10.)   A 
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review of the record reveals that Brackett has failed to establish that the district 
court erred. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
Decisions relating to whether to grant a party’s motion for a continuance 
are within the discretion of the court.  State v. Ward, 98 Idaho 571, 574, 569 P.2d 
916, 919 (1977).  “Unless an appellant shows that his substantial rights have 
been prejudiced by reason of a denial of his motion for continuance, appellate 
courts can only conclude that there was no abuse of discretion.”  Id. (citing State 
v. Cagle, 126 Idaho 794, 797, 891 P.2d 1054, 1057 (Ct. App. 1995)).  
 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion To Deny Brackett’s 
Motion For A Continuance 
 
Brackett filed his second motion for a new trial on October 5, 2015.  (R., 
pp.108-112.)  On November 25, 2015, the district court granted Brackett’s motion 
for appointment of counsel to represent him on the motion.  (R., pp.117-118, 120-
122.)  On March 22, 2016, appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw from the 
case, citing a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship.  (R., pp.242-252.)  
One day earlier, according to appointed counsel’s affidavit submitted in support of 
the motion to withdraw, Brackett expressed a “clear and adamant desire” to 
terminate appointed counsel’s representation.  (R., p.251.)   At the April 1, 2016 
hearing, Brackett confirmed his desire to terminate counsel’s representation and 
to proceed pro se on his second motion for a new trial.  (Tr., p.3, Ls.13-16.)   The 
district court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, permitted Brackett to proceed 
pro se, but denied Brackett’s motion for a continuance.  (Tr., p.4, Ls.12-16; p.7, 
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Ls.6-9; p.23, Ls.16-23; p.46, L.11 – p.47, L.5.) 
The district court acted well within its discretion in denying Brackett’s 
motion for a continuance.  As the district court correctly noted (Tr., p.46, Ls.21-
23), Brackett’s second motion for a new trial had already been pending for 
approximately five months, and the court had already continued the case several 
times (R., pp.134-143).  At the hearing, while Brackett argued about a wide range 
of issues, including many issues well beyond the scope of the motion pending 
before the court, he did not provide any argument regarding why a continuance 
was necessary to develop his assertions related to the Miner affidavit.  (Tr., p.10, 
L.19 – p.26, L.7; p.41, L.20 – p.46, L.9.)  As the court further concluded (Tr., p.46, 
L.25 – p.47, L.5), there was no indication that any admissible evidence relevant 
to the Miner affidavit and associated claims would be found, should the matter be 
continued.  While Brackett had a right to discharge counsel and represent himself 
at the hearing on his second motion for a new trial, he had no corresponding right 
to continue the case to attempt to investigate and develop new claims. 
For all the foregoing reasons, Brackett has failed to show that the district 
court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a continuance.  
 
V. 
The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Consider Brackett’s Motion For The 
Production Of Documents 
  
A. Introduction 
Brackett contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying 
his June 2016 motion for the production of documents.  (Appellant’s brief, p.12, 
14-15.)  Brackett’s claim fails because the district court lacked jurisdiction to rule 
   22 
 
on this motion while Brackett’s appeal from the court’s denial of his second 
motion for a new trial was still pending.     
 
B. The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Consider Brackett’s Motion For 
Production Of Documents While His  Appeal Was Still Pending 
 
The district court denied Brackett’s second motion for a new trial on April 
4, 2016.  (R., pp.343-350.)  Brackett filed a timely notice of appeal from that 
denial on April 19, 2016, commencing the appellate proceedings.  (R., pp.387-
389.)   
On June 24, 2016, Brackett filed a motion for production of various 
documents and unspecified speculative evidence such as “any/all information 
regarding the conspired vicious and malicious prosecution of defendant.”  (R., 
pp.447-449.)  The motion for production was not made in the context of any other 
pending motion or proceeding before the district court, such as a motion for a 
new trial.  (See id.)  It was instead an isolated attempt by Brackett to obtain these 
documents and unspecified information from the state. 
On July 12, 2016, the district court denied the motion for production, 
concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because Brackett’s judgment of conviction 
had already become final upon the June 14, 2016 entry of the Idaho Court of 
Appeals’ opinion affirming Brackett’s conviction.  (R., pp.450-452 (citing State v. 
Villavicencio, 159 Idaho 430, 432, 362 P.3d 1, 3 (Ct. App. 2015) (generally, “a 
court’s authority in a criminal case terminates when the judgment becomes 
final.”)).) 
The district court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction over the motion 
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because Brackett’s judgment had become final was incorrect.  A judgment of 
conviction becomes final upon the entry of the Remittitur following the appeal, 
(when the time for appeal has concluded), and not upon the entry of an Idaho 
Court of Appeals opinion.  See State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 610, 614, 226 P.3d 
552, 556 (Ct. App. 2010).  In this case, the Remittitur in Brackett’s appeal was 
entered on August 5, 2016, after the Idaho Supreme Court denied his petition for 
review.  (#41578 8/5/16 Remittitur.)  Therefore, Brackett’s judgment of conviction 
was not yet final when the district court denied his motion for production of 
documents on July 12, 2016. 
However, Brackett has still failed to show that he is entitled to relief.  An 
appellate court may affirm a district court order on any correct legal theory.  See, 
e.g., State v. Avelar, 129 Idaho 700, 704, 931 P.2d 1218, 1222 (1997).  In this 
case, the district court lacked jurisdiction to rule on Brackett’s motion for 
production not because the judgment of conviction had become final, but 
because the case was stayed pending Brackett’s appeal.  I.A.R. 13(c). 
During the pendency of an appeal, the underlying proceedings in the 
district court are stayed, subject to limited exceptions as provided by Idaho 
Appellate Rule 13(c).  State v. Lemmons, 158 Idaho 971, 974, 354 P.3d 1186, 
1189 (2015); see also Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, 804, 241 P.3d 972, 
977 (2010) (“Upon the filing of Thomasons’ notice of appeal, the district court lost 
jurisdiction over the entire action except as provided in Rule 13 of the Idaho 
Appellate Rules.”).  
As noted above, Brackett filed a timely notice of appeal from the district 
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court’s order denying his second motion for a new trial on April 19, 2016, 
commencing the appellate proceedings.  (R., pp.387-389.)   That appeal was still 
pending when Brackett filed his motion for production of documents on June 24, 
2016.  Therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion 
unless doing so constituted one of the exceptions set forth in I.A.R. 13(c).   
Ruling on motions for discovery is not one of the enumerated tasks listed 
in I.A.R. 13(c).  Idaho Appellate Rule 13(c)(10) provides that a district court may, 
while proceedings are stayed pending appeal, “[e]nter any other order after 
judgment affecting the substantial rights of the defendant as authorized by law.”  
The state submits that a district court order ruling on Brackett’s motion for 
production is not an order affecting his “substantial rights” because Brackett had 
no right, substantial or otherwise, to post-verdict discovery.  While the Idaho 
Criminal Rules govern pretrial discovery procedures, and the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure govern discovery in civil post-conviction proceedings (once discovery 
is ordered by a court in a post-conviction case), no Idaho rule authorizes 
discovery in a criminal case after the defendant has been convicted.  Further, I.C. 
§ 19-2406 provides no mechanism for pursuing discovery in the pursuit of a 
motion for a new trial.   
Because the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Brackett’s motion 
for production of documents, Brackett cannot show that the district court erred by 
denying the motion.  This Court should therefore affirm the district court’s denial 
order.   
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VI. 
This Court Lacks Jurisdiction To Consider Brackett’s Challenges To The District 
Court’s Denial Of His January 2015 Motion For A New Trial 
  
A. Introduction 
In his Appellant’s brief, Brackett appears to raise challenges associated 
with his January 2015 motion for a new trial.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.12-14.)  This 
Court lacks jurisdiction to reach the merits of these claims because Brackett’s 
notice of appeal was not timely from the district court’s denial of that motion. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“‘A question of jurisdiction is fundamental; it cannot be ignored when 
brought to [the appellate courts’] attention and should be addressed prior to 
considering the merits of an appeal.’”  State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 483, 
80 P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003) (quoting H & V Engineering, Inc. v. Idaho State Bd. of 
Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 648, 747 P.2d 55, 
57 (1987)).  Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law, given free 
review.  Kavajecz, 139 Idaho at 483, 80 P.3d at 1084. 
 
C. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction To Reach Brackett’s Appellate Challenges To 
The District Court’s January 2015 Order Denying His First Motion For A 
New Trial 
 
An appeal from the district court “may be made only by physically filing a 
notice of appeal … within 42 days” of an appealable order.  I.A.R. 14(a).  A timely 
filed notice of appeal is a prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction.  I.A.R. 21; State v. 
Payan, 128 Idaho 866, 920 P.2d 82 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Fuller, 104 Idaho 
891, 665 P.2d 190 (Ct. App. 1983).  The failure to file a notice of appeal within the 
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time limits prescribed by the appellate rules requires “automatic dismissal” of the 
appeal.  I.A.R. 21; see also State v. Tucker, 103 Idaho 885, 888, 655 P.2d 92, 95 
(1982). 
In this case, the district court denied Brackett’s January 2015 motion for a 
new trial on February 6, 2015.  (R., pp.95-99.)  Brackett did not file a notice of 
appeal timely from this order.  Instead, Brackett filed the notice of appeal which 
commenced the present appeal from the district court’s April 19, 2016 denial of 
his second motion for a new trial.  (R., pp.387-389.)  Therefore, this Court lacks 
jurisdiction to consider challenges to the district court’s February 2015 denial 
order associated with Brackett’s first motion for a new trial. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s 
order denying Brackett’s second motion for a new trial. 
DATED this 27th day of July, 2017. 
 
 
 
       __/s/ Mark W. Olson_______ 
      MARK W. OLSON 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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